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FOREWARD
A review of titles of reports associated with project NGL 24-005-160
reveals an interesting evolution of thought and analysis.	 The original
title of the project was "Safety of Cor)Lainment Systems, ti and the intent
was to design controls against back contamination from possible return of
samples in space exploration. 	 Analysis of experiences of the Lunar
Receiving Laboratory and of available containment technology suggested that
the primary risks of back contamination lay in the behavior of people
applying the available technology, not in the shortcomings of technology.
Subsequently the title of the project was revised to "Personnel Management
Techniques Necessary to Maximize Bio-Barrier Integrity at a martian Receiving
Laboratory, tt reflecting the change in focus of the investigation.	 Continued
investigation and analysis suggested that behavioral problems in the
application of containment technology were more a function of organizational
influences than a function of personal variables.	 Hence the title of this
report, which focuses upon primary organizational issues in the development
and application of programs for protection against back contamination.
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ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST
BACK CONTAMINATION
INTRODUCTION
The threat of extraterrestrial contamination has been a matter of concern
to scientists and others since the early days of space exploration. The
Outer Space Treaty of 1966 recognizes the possibility of harmful contamination
of extraterrestrial bodies (outbound contamination) and of our planet (inbound
contamination) and imposes responsibilities upon participating states for the
prevention of contamination. Article V, for example, requires the sharing
of outer space discoveries".. which could constitute a danger to the life or
health of astronauts...," and Article IX requires that states conducting
studies of outer space "...[shall] avoid their harmful contamination and also
adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting from the introduction
of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt appropriate
measures for this purpose...." Incorporation of these responsibilities into
the U.S. space activities has proven difficult for a number of reasons. Prevention
of extraterrestrial contamination is of special concern again with the planning
of Viking missions to explore Mars and possibly to return samples to earth
for analysis.
The issues of outbound and inbound contamination differ significantly in at
least two respects. First, outbound contamination is concerned with the
prevention of known organisms from being carried to extraterrestrial bodies,
while inbound contamination is concerned with prevention of unknown organisms
from being introduced to earth; it is far easier to plan for and cope with the
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known than with the unknown. Second, responsibility for the control of
	
..s
outbound contamination falls logically within the domain of a single agency, 	 `f
the National Aeronautics and Space Aaministration (NASA), while various
"R
agencies of the federal government are assigned differing responsibilities
for the prevention of inbound contamination. Consequently, organization
for the prevention of inbound contamination is far more complex and difficult
	 F
than organizing for the prevention of outbound contamination.
This report is concerned with the organizational issues pertaining to
the prevention of inbound contamination associated with possible Viking
missions to Mars. The completed Apollo missions, which returned samples
from the Moon, provide a convenient base for analysis of inbound contamination
issues. Despite concern over the threat of inbound contamination from the
moon and efforts to prevent back contamination, it is generally concluded that
the back contamination efforts in the Apollo missions would have been in-
	
h
effective had these missions encountered living organisms. Those planning for
the prevention of back contamination from the Viking missions should analyze
the reasons for failure of back contamination efforts in the Apollo missions
and should design alternatives to remove or overcome the reasons for this
failure.
The alleged failure of programs to prevent back contamination from the
Apollo missions was not evident in the actual occurrence of back contamination.
No evidence of living organisms was encountered. Mather, it has been argued
that the programs implemented to prevent back contamination would not have
been adequate to prevent back contamination had living organisms been discovered.
i
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Undoubtedly one of the reasons for the inadequate performance of back
contamination prevention programs was the widespread belief that no danger
was present. The possibility of encountering life on future missions,
although small, is much greater than it was in the Apollo missions and is a
cause for concern. The inadequate performance in implementation >f measures
to prevent back contamination from the Apollo missions is surprising in
view of the recognized successes of NASA in both technological and managerial
aspects of space flights. NASA has pioneered many innovative managerial
techniques for large scale organizations, but the program for prevention of
back contamination apparently was not successful. Problems in the implementation
of back contamination programs'appear to have been organizational, and
managerial rather than technological.
The basic issue of concern is: "how should programs be designed for the
prevention of back contamination from space missions such as the planned Viking
missions?" As suggested earlier, this analysis focuses upon reasons for
difficulties encountered in the pro;zai.Bs for the prevention of back contamination
in the Apollo flights. Based upon that analysis, several alternatives for
consideration in the design of future programs dealing with back contamination
are examined and proposed for special consideration.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration was established in 1958
through Congressional legislation. NASA, as a civilian agency, was charged
with overall aeronautical and space responsibilities except those concerned with
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1) "expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in the atmosphere and
space...
2) "[perfection] of aeronautical and space vehicles...
3) "long--range studies of the potential benefits... and problems...[of
peaceful] space activities...
4) "preservation of the rule of the United States as a leader in
aeronautical and space science
5) "making.available to [defense] agencies...discoveries that have
military value
6) "cooperation ... with other nations...in . peaceful. [aeronautical and
space] application
7) "close cooperation among all interested agencies of the United States
in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities and
equipment. 113
Specific issues relating to extraterrestrial contamination were not mentioned
in the enabling legislation. Responsibility for protection against extra-
terrestrial contamination was accepted by the U.S. as signatory to the Outer
Space Treaty but there has been no statutory assignment of these responsibilities
to NASA or other federal. agencies.
Issues regarding the location of responsibility for prevention of back
contamination and authority for implementin g programs to prevent back
`	 contamination appear upon review to be critical in analysis of the back contamina=
tion programs. of the Apollo flights. Every large organization must:.differentiate
responsibilities assigned subordinate bodies (i.e. specialize) in struggling
t
for efficiency of performance; this need for differentiation is particularly
acute in circumstances involving rapidly changing technology such as space
:
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exploration. Differentiation of responsibilities makes more difficult the
integration of activities of specialized organization sub-units. Differentiation
of specialization without equivalent development of means for integration is of
little value. NASA has, by most accounts, been highly successful in the
development of means for integration of activities among highly diffenentiated
organizational assignments; techniques of PERT (Program Evaluation and Review
Technique) planning, matrix organization., and project management were developed
and applied successfully within NASA for the integration of differentiated
responsibilities. 4 Responsibility for the prevention of back contamination
accepted in the space treaty does not, however, appear to have been clearly
assigned to NASA. Rather, responsibility for the prevention of and authorities
to prevent back contamination appears to have been diffused among various
federal agencies; these are examined in later sections, of this report. The
basic issue to be addressed in the design of programs to prevent back
contamination from the Viking flights is the most appropriate dif€erentiati.on
of responsibilities for prevention of the introduction of contaminants and
vehicles for the adequate integration of activities to prevent such contamination.
This is an organizational issue concerning vrrious federal agencies (Agriculture,
Interior, and Health, Education, and Welfare), not merely an organizational issue
confined to NASA.
HISTORI= BACKGROUND
l'a
NASAi.
^e
	
	 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was established in
1958 in direct response to the Russian launching of Sputnik in October, 1957.
NASA's' purpose was to coordinate and mobilize. U.S. space efforts to ensure U.S.
^	 I	 I	 I	 I	 i
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leadership in this area of activity. A predecessor agency, the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) had been established in 1915 to
study and develop practical solutions to problems of flight. With the
exception of the World War II period, most of the NACA efforts had been
directed toward basic research in flight technology, not the application
of technology. Directed research in flight technology was conducted largely
by the military. Congressional intent in the establishment of NASA apparently
was to mobilize U.S. space efforts through consolidation of all non-military
space and aeronautics activities within a single agency to achieve and
maintain world leadership in space science and technology, and to incorporate
national objectives of space exploration and science with the NACA objectives
relatirg to flight technology.5
Consolidation ag aeronautic and space activities was sought through
directing presidential review of activities and transfer of activities to NASA
as appropriate. Authority was granted to the President to transfer to NASA
"any functions (including powers, duties, activities, facilities or parts of
functions) of any other department or agency ... 11 for a period of four years,
subject to review by Congress* 6 Among other such transfers, the NACA was
abolished and its functions transferred to NASA.
Issues relating to coordination of efforts among federal agencies also
were recognized in the 1958 Space Act, which provided for the exchange of
i	 information and discoveries among agencies particularly as they relate to national
defense, and for "close cooperation among all interested agencies of the
United States in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities
and equipment. ,
 Title II of the National Aeronautics and Space Act explicitly
referred to the coordination of activities and, among other provisions,
-7-
established the National Aeronautical and Space (NAS) Council to	 advise the
President about space activities and programs. 	 The act also provided for co-
operation between NASA and the Department of Defense and the resolution of
differences arising among agencies of the V.S. with respect to aeronautical
and space activities.	 Responsibility for coordination of activities was
assigned to the President.
Much of the early effort of NASA was directed toward development of
technological capabilities for the conduct of outer space exploration. 	 Programs
were developed relatively quickly in the areas of advanced research and
technology, tracking and data acquisition, and applications of space technology.
Centers (facilities) for the application of these programs also were identified
or established as needed. 	 The distinction between "program" and "center" in
the NASA organization is apparent throughout the history of NASA operations,
and concern over the relative roles of program offices and centers has provided
the impetus for various experiments in the development of organizational frame-
:.	 f;:V
works.
Program management in NASA involves the planning and direction of an inter-
related series of research and development projects designed to achieve one
or more of NASA's major objectives. 8
	Program offices in NASA have varied over
time but have included programs directed toward development of aeronautics and
space technology, manned space flight, and missile tracking and data systems.
" Program specializing in a single functional aspect of space activities.
NASA field centers are responsible for the execution of NASA programs, largely
through contracts with research, development, and manufacturing enterprises.
Each center maintains and operates specialized facilities for space activities.
i^
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Additionally each center is expected to have the capability for preliminary
design, fabrication, assembly, and testing of at least one vehicle and
spacecraft unique to each major program. 9 Field centers constitute the
operations organization of NASA and are specialized in terms of skill,
technology, and facilities.
Program offices have primary responsibility for the direction of overall
NASA efforts and exercise functional supervision over projects; field centers
are responsible for program execution and exercise operational supervision over
projects. Problems involved in the coordination of program offices and
field centers have occasioned various organizational experiments within NASA
and the development of relatively advanced managerial practices.
NASA program offices prior to 1959 focused upon the development of
technological capabilities for the conduct of space research; there was no
program office or effort directed toward bioscience or life science in tbez
space effort of NASA. An ad hoc Bioscience Advisory Committee appointed by
10
NASA in 1959, recommended that NASA develop programs in the biosciences.
That committee recommended that an Office of Life Sciences be established with
a director coordinate in rank with existing program directors, that is, that
a program in Life Sciences be established with priorities equivalent to the
r	 priorities assigned existing NASA programs. This recommendation was based
A <	 upon recognition that NASA had responsibility for manned space flights and
..	 ^:.; upon recognition of the possible danger resulting from contact with extra-
terrestrial life. An Office of Life Sciences Programs subsequently was i
established within. NASA in March, 1960, although development of the office and
related programs was implemented slowly.
a
_9_
The appointment of a new director of NASA in 1961 provided the occasion
for examination of the MSA organization and subsequent reorganization in
November, 1961. An internal examination of NASA during that time noted,
among other things, that there was imbalance among the program offices; the
Office of Fife Sciences was too weak and the Office of Space Ylight was too
strong. Interestingly, the Office of Life Sciences was dropped in the
November, 1961 reorganization of program offices after a life span of less
than two years. A November, 1962 organization chart does, however, indicate
responsibility for bioscience programs within the Office of Space .^r•iences;
other responsibilities of that Office include geophysics and astronomy programs,
launch vehicles and propulsion programs, and lunar and planetary programs.
Responsibilities indicated for the Office of Advanced Research and Technology
include biotechnology and human research as well as nuclear systems, space
vehicles, aeronautical research, propulsion and power generation, and electronics
and control. Clearly the concern for life sciences indicated in the 1960
creation of an Office of Life Sciences was not evidenced in the NASA re-
organization in 1961. 11
This brief review of the history of bioscience and life sciences efforts
within NASA suggests that concern for the life science implications of space
exploration were given relatively little priority in NASA efforts. This
relative lack of concern can be explained in terms of the necessarily high
priarity for development of technology capabilities, the lack of clear
authorization of NASA efforts in the life sciences given responsibilities of
other federal agencies, and pressures upon NASA to avoid duplication of other
.	 federal efforts. The fact remains, however, that concern for life sciences
Relationships between NASA and other federal agencies were a matter of
concern in the design of the Space Act of 1958 and continue to be of concern.
The intent of that act apparently was to provide a means for focusing and
integrating efforts toward space exoloration, efforts that might otherwise
have been conducted independently by a variety of federal programs. 	 Various
other federal programs (notably Defense) had clear concerns for space
technology	 and applications, and the creation of NASA was intended to expedite
the development of technology for space exploration through integration of
these varied interests and efforts.	 The National Aeronautics and Space Council
created in the 1958 Space Act was one means of attempting to provide coordination
among federal programs relating to the space effort. 	 That council, composed
of designated federal officials and appointed civilians, was charged with
advisin& the President relative to aeronautics and space efforts. 	 Interestingly,
the role of the council was changed in amendments to the Space Act in 1961, the
revised role to provide for expanded responsibilities. 12	The council was placed
within the Executive Office of the President, the civilian members were dropped
from the council, and the council was charged with assisting the President in
the aeronautics and space field. 	 Additionally, the duties of the council were
expanded to include cooperation "among all departments and agencies of the
United States engaged in aeronautical and space activities."	 By implication,
the NAS Council was charged with providing cooperations among federal efforts
in the life sciences and space activities.	 The NAS council was abolished in 1973.33
Concern for protection against back contamination from space flights was
expressed during the planning of the Apollo missions to the moon and the return
of astronauts and Lunar samples.	 A conference dealing with back contamination
n
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the National Academy of Sciences in July, 1.961+. 14
 (The
NAS has had an advisory relationship with NASA since 1958.)
	 The concern raised
by the NAS and members of the scientific community made it imperative that
NASA take account of these concerns in the planning and implementation of
manned space flights to the moon.
	 Lacking any clearly designated legislative
responsibility for protection against back contamination or legislative
authority to impose protective meauures such as quarantine, NASA appears to
have initiated informal contact and discussion with the Public Health Service
and the Department of Agriculture regarding back contamination issues.
	 This
informal relationship continued until 1967, when the Interagency Committee on
Back Contamination (ICBC) was formed.15
One reason for the formalization of relationships within the ICBC probably
was the negotiation'of an international Outer Space Treaty in 1966.
	 That
treaty provides that studies of outer space and exploration of the moon and
other celestial bodies should be conducted in such a manner as "to avoid their
harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth
resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter. J6
	The obligation
to protect Earth's biosphere against harmful back contamination was accepted
by the United States, and the ICBC developed as the vehicle for meeting this
obligation with regard to back contamination from lunar sources.
A history'of the ICBC in the development and implementation of back
contamination programs associated with the Apollo flights is analyzed in a
later section of this report.
	 The discussion of the ICBC at this point is
intended to demonstrate the general nature of NASA concerns with back contamination
and means of acting on these concerns.
	 It was noted earlier that programs
concerned with the life sciences in NASA received relatively low priority compared
2.
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with space technology and astronomical research. The Outer Space Treaty (1966)
and pressures from the scientific community and the National Academy of
Sciences imposed obligations upon NASA for protection against back contamination
associated with the Apollo flights. Serious questions have been raised about
the :Legal authority for quarantine regulations employed during the Apollo
flights, and proposals have been made to rectify the currently confusing status.
No such changes have been accomplished, however, and specific responsibilities
for performance of the obligations of the Outer Space Treaty and authority to
employ quarantine in protection against back contamination from space .flights
have not been established. The ICBC was abandoned following the Apollo flights,
and the situation surrounding the planned Viking flights to Mars is essentially
the same as that which existed prior to the Apollo flights.
TCBC
The Interagency Committee on Back Contamination has been viewed as a
primary instrument in the back contamination efforts associated with the Apollo
flights. The mixed reviews of the efficacy of those efforts suggest tba.t a
brief review of the experiences of the ICBC is in order.
The TCBC, although formalized in an interagency agreement in August, 1967,
had been developing less formally since 1964. Coordinating relationships
appear to have been established earlier between NASA and the Public Health
Service. A PHS employee, Dr. Briggs Phillips, was appointed to represent the
PHS at the Manned Space Center before the formalization of the TCBC. His contact
at the MSC was the director of medical research and operations, who was
responsible for all back contamination efforts at the MSC or the chief of
Biomedical Specialities Branch, who was responsible to the director for execution
of back contamination procedures. Dr. Phillips's role was to keep both NASA
and PHS informed of problems of mutual interest, to expedite coordination of
--
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efforts in these problem areas, and to aid in communications between programs
of both agencies.17
The Public Health Service has the authority to make and enforce regulations a
to prevent the introduction and spread of communicable disease into the
United States and thus, presumably, might regulate reentry of lunar astronauts
into the U.S.	 It would appear that NASA was motivated to coordinate back
contamination efforts with the PHS prior to reentry of astronauts to avoid
a confrontation at that time.	 Similarly, the Department of Agriculture
regulates the importation of organisms, vectors and sails, and the Department
of Interior is responsible for protecting fish and wildlife resources,
responsibilities that might also occasion confrontation with NASA regarding
the importation of lunar samples. 	 All three agencies were parties to the
TCBC as it was developed.
The interagency agreement establishing the 1CBC and applications of this
agreement present a confusing picture of the responsibility and authority for
protection against back contamination from the Apollo flights. 	 The purpose
stated in the agreement suggests that the TCBC is responsible for protection
against back contamination. $	 Examination of the agreement, the operations of
the ZCBC, and relationships between, the TCBC and NASA, however, suggests that
the NBC was created by NASA as a means of fending off pressures from the
concerned agencies and preventing those agencies from taking actions that might
i
have frustrated the primary mission of the Apollo flights. 	 Evidence for this
1.
interpretation includes the following:
3
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Definition of the functions of the ICBC limits the Committee
to "advising," "recommending," "considering," and "reviewing"
actions.
Eleven members of the ICBC were specified, two from the PHS,
one each from Agriculture, Interior, and the National Academy T
of Sciences, and six from NASA.
	
While the chairman and deputy
chairman were designated as PHS members, the executive secretary
was designated as a NASA member. 	 Further, it was specified
- that no meeting could be held without the attandance of some
NASA representatives.
No voting procedures were specified. ;..
NASA clearly viewed the ICBC as advisory to NASA, and, to the
frustration of ICBC members, the ICBC was designated as
'advisory" on occasion.
ICBC members from agencies other than NASA had other full—time
responsibilities and were able to devote relatively little time
i
7
and attention to ICBC matters. '}
Funds for the conduct of investigations or the implementation
of programs recommended by the ICBC were available only from
' NASA, and the Committee had no independent source of funds.
An incident is widely cited of NASA's alleged inability to
t..
implement ICBC quarantine procedures because of technological
z
°!
incapabilities, incapabilities that were overcome when the
quarantine restrictions on the Apollo flights were later lifted. f
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This alleged incapability is cited as evidence of NASA pressure
to avoid constraints imposed to prevent back contamination when
they came into conflict with other NASA objectices.
The Public Health Service representative at the Manned Space Center,
Dr. Briggs Phillips, had no line authority with respect to
implementation of quarantine provisions. He could only exercise
informal influence through individuals in the MSC or through
communication to the PH5 and thus to the ICBC.
NASA's goals and objectives were concerned with development and implementa-
tion of technolgical capabilities for space flight and exploration. The
prevention of back contamination resulting from space exploration was
not a central objective of NASA; it was a constraint whose achievement
was a more central goal of the other agencies represented on the ICBC. The
risk of back contamination from lunar exploration was generally considered
minimal, and it is not surprising that prevention, of back contamination
held relatively low priority within the NASA objectives. In effect, NASA's
objective regarding back contamination was to secure approval of operations
from other involved agencies rather than to secure protection against
back contamination; this latter goal was not fully incorporated into NASA
operational objectives. The ICBC provided NASA with a mechanism for
securing approval whether or not the ICBC provided an effactive mechanism
for protecting against the risk of back contamination.
-f
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The organization of federal programs concerned with back contamination
from space exploration and the actual back contamination efforts during
the Apollo flights illustrate several models in the organization theory
literature. One of these, the "contingency model" of Lawrence and Lorsch,
applies the concepts of differentiation (specialization) and integration
(coordination) in the analysis of organization structure and identifies
determinants of the appropriate degree of differentiation and means of
integrating specialized functions. 19 The model addresses alternative
means of integrating or coordinating differentiated functions required for
organizational efficiency.
Functions are differentially assigned to specialized organizational
units to provide efficiency of performance. According to Lawrence and
Lorsch, the degree of differentiation required depends critically upon
the nature of the enviroxcments affecting the organization. The more
differentiated the environments (clients, suppliers, resources), the more
specialized and differentiated the organization structure must be. Thus,
for example, a specialized public relations function becomes necessary only
as there develops a relevant public pressure requiring specialized attention.
is	 The degree of specialization or differentiation also varies with the
uncertainty and rate of change in the environment; an environmental press ire
that changes rapidly (e.g. advances in technology) requires more specialized
-.<	 attention than an environment that is relatively stable over time. Thus
effective performance of the organization requires specialization and
differentiation of responsibilities adequate to cope with and exploit
opportunities provided by the environment.
.L...	 {
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Increasing differentiation of responsibilities through specialization
creates barriers to coordination or integration. Persons working in specialized
units develop common disciplinary bonds and orientations that differ from
those found in other specialized units. Specialized units are assigned specific
goals that often replace the goals of the total organization. Informal co-
operation and coordination among members of specialized functional units
declines as differentiated goals, values, and orientations developo and
specific means of providing coordination or integration must be sought to Over-
come the developing barriers to cooperation. Specialization or differentiation,
then, is effective to the extent that it is balanced by integrative techniques.
A variety of approaches toward integration can be identified, each more
or less applicable depending upon the specific circumstances. One approach to
integration is through planning and scheduling; differentiated functions
proceed independently toward specific goals and are integrated through schedules
for completion of individual activities. Another approach to integration is
through organizational structuring; differentiated units that must be coordinated
report to a single position, which provides integration through coordinated
directives (the "linking pin t' concept of Rensis Likert). 2Q other approaches to
integrate involve individuals who informally buffer relationships between
potentially conflicting units and provide integration through persona.i efforts.
The organization of the federal government illustrates differentiation
and specialization to cope with relatively specific environmental contingencies
(e.g. Departments of Defense, State, Labor, Agriculture). Legislation
establishing these specialized functions is designed, insofar as possible, to
avoid integration by eliminating overlapping interests and concerns. If necessary,
`'	 integrative efforts can be applied through the Cabinet, councils such as the
6-18-
National Defense Council., or personal efforts of the Executive office of the
PresVent. The establishment of NASA also can a viewed as an attempt toward
integration, although it also led to new issues of differentiation. The
a
development and application of technology for space exploration posed issues
(weather ;Forecasting, defense,communications, scientific exploration) of concern
to a number of federal agencies and created the opportunity for potential conflict
among agencies. Integration of previously independent space activities was
provided in the creation of NASA which was established as a specialized
organizational body to conduct aeronautical and space activities. Integration
was attempted through creation of a specialized organizational body charged with
the conduct of all aeronautical and space activities. In fact, the Space Act
of 1958, which established NASA, recognized implicitly the nature of integration
being attempted and certain of the potential problems in this attempt. NASA
was created as a specialized organizational unit to provide integration of
activities, but it was not expected to provide integration of the interests,
goals, and priorities of existing federal agencies as they relate to space
activities; the National Aeronautical. and Space Council was formed to serve this
function.
once established, NASA developed into a specialized organizational unit
with goals, responsibilities, orientations, and priorities differentiated from
those of other federal units. The major goals and value orientations developed
within NASA appear to be directed primarily to the development and application
of technology for space exploration. These differentiated responsibilities,
values, and orientations created the potential for conflict with other federal
programs and the need for an integrative mechanism like the NAS Council.
u
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Organizational experimentation within NASA also reflects a continuing
search for appropriate balance be:,^een differentiation and integration.	 Program
offices within NASA reflect specialized functions and responsibilities (tracking,
space technology, applicatiors,
	
space research) and the field centers reflect
differentiated facilities and capabilities (manned space flight, launch
a
operations, unmanned space flight).
	
Reorganization efforts within NASA during
the 1950's and 1960's appear to have been attempts to achieve integration among
4
program offices in terms of center utilization. 	 The configuration of program
offices within NASA reflects specialized areas of knowledge or opecialized
pressures from the scientific and industrial environments. 	 The short-lived
Office of Life Sciences was a direct response to pressure from the scientific
community,	 pressure 	h	 interpreted	 central	 o	 he mission ofq
	 , &. 	  t at was not	   as f 	 1 t	 t
NASA.
Another relevant model from organization theory relates to methods of
decision making and conflict resolution within organizations (See Figure 1).'
Conflict situations are differentiated in terms of two relevant dimensions:
(1) the amount of consensus or agreement over goals, and (Z) the amount of _.
certainty of knowledge of the involved parties concerning the decision situation.
Four modes of decision making are identified for different configurations of T
-i
t	 goal consensus and certainty of knowledge.
^I
•	 Goal consensus-knowledge certainty. 	 There is no real basis ?1
for conflict in cases in which all parties agree upon the goals
:i
to be achieved and possess certain knowledge concerning elements
of the situation. 	 Decisions are reached through established
programs or policies.
F e a Y
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COMPROMISE, BARGAINING, POLITICS
DECISION MAKING IN DIFFERENT CONFLICT SITUATIONS
FIGURE 1
•	 Goal consensus-knowledge uncertainty. Parties are agreed
upon the goals to be sought, but uncertainties in knowledge
concerning the situation lead to conflict in the choice of
means. Decision making in this situation requires a sharing
of knowledge and pooling of expert judgments, (a committee of Abi.
technical experts, for example)•
•	 Goal differences--knowledge certainty. This situation is one
of conflict over the ends sought, not the effectiveness of
specified means. Decision making requires negotiation or
compromise.
Goal differences-knowledge uncertainty. The primary basis
for conflict is a difference in ends sought. The uncertainties
of knowledge concerning the situation, however, provide an
expanded arena for negotiation and political decision making.
J1
Negotiation over ends may be masked as disagreements over the 	 C.9A
effectiveness of alternative means, and the potential for
conflict is significantly larger than in a situation in which
knowledge certainty is present.
The admission and confrontation of goal differences in organizational
decision making typically is resisted because of the implicit threat to 	 1
organizational integrity, and attempts are made to reach decisions through
administrative means rather than through avowedly political means.
Concerns for the risk of back contamination from the Apollo flights
created a potential conflict situation within the federal government. NASA,
the PHS, the Departments of Agriculture and Interior $ and the National Academy
of Sciences all had different concerns for prevention of back contamination,
I.^_ _I I _I 4.
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of alternative means of preventing back contamination. The conflict model
outlined above suggests the opportunity for political bargaining in conflict
resolution and decision making. Differentiated responsibilities within the
federal gave.°nment led to a situation of interagency conflict over the risk
of back contamination, a situation requiring special means for integrating
agency efforts and resolving the conflicts regarding back contamination.
The TCBC established as a formal integrative body for the resolution
of conflict over back contamination issues in the Apollo flights. Minutes
of TCBC meetings and briefing materials give the impression that the TCBC
was a joint committee of experts with agreed-upon goals who hoped to pool
expert knowledge on the contamination control methods to be employed. The
earlier analysis of the structure, composition, and powers of the TCBC
suggests that the committee was employed by NASA as a means of avoiding
political bargaining over ends and was restricted to advising NASA concerning
means of preventing back contamination. It does not appear, however, that
Y
all parties respresnted in the TCBC shared the same goal priorities and
commitment to prevention of back contamination risks. The employment of
committees of experts pooling judgments about means is only appropriate as
a decision making approach in cases in which there is goal consensus. Hany
of the alleged failures of the Apollo back contamination programs can be
tracLd to the lack of such consensus.
4
	
	 One significant factor affecting the Apollo back contamination efforts
was the belief, which was confirmed, that no living organizms would be
encountered in the Apollo flights. Judged in terms of overall probability
of risk of back contamination, the Apollo back contamination efforts might
be viewed as quite successful; judged in terms of conditional probability
`	 of risk given encounter with living organisms, this judgment of success might
c
rs
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be questioned. Even thi s xelatively simple difference in goals creates the
potential for co;;flict a-^,-.g agencies concerned with back contamination, a
conflict not resoZ*u.. ye through pooling of expert ,judgments.
Viewed retrospectively, the ICBS was less effective as an organizational
mechanism for integrating efforts of NASA, the PHS, and the Departments of
Agriculture and Interior and more effective as a differentiated effort of
NASA for coping with the pressures exerted by the regulatory agencies.
REFORMULATION OF ISSUES
Earlier in this report is was suggested that three conditions were needed
for success in any program to prevent back contamination, conditions not
fully met in the Apollo flights:
1) Recognition of risk of back contamination and commitment to the
prevent±on of such a risk.
The risk of back contamination from the Apollo missions was generally
considered minimal. The consequences of possible back contamination also were
unknown, making it difficult to obtain agreement on the degree of protection
to be provided. Commitment to the prevention of back contamination was diffused.
While the Space Treaty obliged all signatories tto protect against back
contamination, responsibility for Chat obligation was not specifically assigned
to any organizational body in the U.S. The Nationr.l Academy of Sciences,
Public Health Service, and the Departments of Agriculture and Interior each
had specific concerns relating to back contamination, but protection against
back contamination was a relatively minor element in the task iomain of each.
The primary orientation of NASA appears to have been the development and
application of space technology; the prevention of back contamination was a
constraint imposed upon NASA rather than a primary goal, integral to the entire
program of NASA.
2) Possession of knowledge about risk of back contamination and means
of eliminating or reducing that risk.
Knowledge about the threat of back contamination from space and means of
alleviating that risk is diffused among the nation 's scientists and
scientific organizations. The PHS and Departments of Agriculture and Interior
have knowledge about dangers of known communicable diseases and infestation
but know relatively little about the possibility of unknown contaminants from
outer space. NASA is in the prime position to develop knowledge about space,
but the relative lack of concern for life sciences demonstrated in NASA
programs suggests there has been little development of knowledge concerning
possible contaminants from space.
3) Possession of resources (funds and personnel) for the development
and statutory power for the implementation of programs to prevent
back contamination.
Financial resources for the study of space exploration are centered in NASA,
not in the PHS or Departments of Agriculture and Interior. Abandonment of the
NAS Council makes difficult the coordination of research efforts of joint
concern to all agencies unless such coordination is fostered by NASA. Abandonment
of the life sciences program office in NASA further complicates the development
of any coordinated program for development of knowledge of back contamination
risks.
The existing statutory power to impose protective measures against back
contamination is questionable. Consideration of this issue was apparent in
the fcrmulation of the ICBC and has been the subject of several legal. analyses.
The legal power and authority of the federal government to impose quarantine
restrictions upon space missions, for example, is debatable. What statutory
power exists appears to reside with the PHS and Departments of Agriculture
j
1
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and Interior, not with NASA. 22
The diffusion of powers and responsibilities among federal agencies
made difficult any integration of efforts for protection against back
contamination from the Apollo missions. This dif f=4-on stems in part from
the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches in
the federal government. Agencies are created and assigned responsibilities
through legislative action; the executive branch is charged with administration
of the agencies within the framework of enabling legislation. Agencies tend
to develop into relatively independent bodies responding to relatively
specialized constituencies. The budgetary process, controlled by both the
executive and the legislature, becomes the primary means of directing day-to-day
activities and accomplishing integration of activities among different agencies.
Much of the integration that occurs is a consequence of efforts of individuals
serving in the Executive Office or individuals serving in one agency who
seek integration with other agencies through informal influences.
The ICBC of the Apollo program illustrates one approach to integration
among federal agencies. The committee appears to have had its origin in
informal contacts among agencies concerned with the problems posed by back
contamination. The group was later formalized in an interagency agreement.
That agreement, as noted earlier, did not resolve the confusion regarding
powers and responsibilities of the involved agencies, but it did provide a
framework within which informal influences would be exercised. Much of the
integration of efforts achieved through the ICBC was the consequence of
informal influence exercised by individuals such as Dr. Briggs Phillips rather
than of the more formal relationships specified in the interagency agreement.
r"
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In order to develop programs for protection against back contamination
;a
from space exploration, organizational relationships must be developed that
will satisfy the conditions developed above and dec-ease reliance upon
`= a
informal activities of individuals to achieve integration of efforts.
Development of effective programs for the prevention of back contamination
from future space missions requires reorganization of federal responsibilities
and clarification of powers for prevention of back contamination. 	 Alternative
strategies for achieving this reorganization are detailed and examined below.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES
A variety of organizational strategies for integrating responsibilities
and efforts for prevention of back contamination can be identified, each with
certain advantages and disadvantages. 	 In general, these strategies seek
integration through structural relationships (reporting relationships, task
and role definition, delegations of responsibility and authority) or through
interpersonal relationships (shared values, understanding, informal communica-
tions and decision Making).	 The strategies reviewed here all focus predominantly
on integration through structural change and alignment of goals and
responsibilities, rather than upon less formal methods such as interpersonal
intervention.	 All the proposed strategies require some degree of legislative
action to restructure responsibilities among federal agencies and to clarify
and ensure possession of requisite powers to impose prevention measures such
as quarantine. Change in the structure of responsibilities and powers also
appears to be a more powerful strategy than interpersonal intervention,
given the existing rigidity of federal organization of agencies.
PODLEA RELATIONSHIPS
One organizational strategy for the prevention of back contamination
involves formalized, clear differentiation of responsibilities and authority
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to implement controls over back contamination. This s-_ategy requires complete
analysis of all issues involved in back contamination, separation of these
issues and implied responsibilities, and assignment of segmented, specialized,
and independent responsibilities to various federal agencies. Each agency
would proceed independently to accomplish its assigned responsibilites and,
presumably, the pooled effects of these efforts would constitute the overall
program to prevent back contamination. Thus, for example, the PHS might
be assigned responsibility to prevent back contamination through returning
astronauts, and the Department of Agriculture might be assigned responsibility
for prevention of back contamination through returned space samples. (See
Figure 2)
An obvious advantage of this strategy is that it would build upon
existing specialization of knowledge, tradition, and orientation of federal
programs. Each agency would continue within its own differentiated
traditions with a minimum of concern about and interaction with other agencies.
There would be relatively little goal consensus among the involved agencies,
but this would be of little concern since no joint decision making would
be required. Results of the programs within the regulatory agencies
would be imposed upon NASA, as constraints and decisions requiring joint
consideration of various requirements would be centered within NASA. Conflict
among agencies would be formalized in terms of goals and constraints unposed
upon NASA; the degree of such conflict would depend upon the degree to which
the overall issues involved in prevention of back contamination could be
differentiated in truly independent responsibilites.
Other correlated• organizational changes also would be necessary for
this strategy to succeed. One such change relates to the power of the
regulatory agencies to impose constraints upon NASA. The development of
quarantine provisions by the PHS, for example, would have little impact
upon NASA operations if the PISS lacked statutory power to impose these
Operational Space Missions
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Agriculture
Responsible for pre-	 \
vention of infesta-
NASA
Responsible for design
of technology and con-
duct of space mission.
Interior
Responsible for pro-
tection of wildlife
and natural resources.
Public Health
Responsible for pro-
tection of public
health and prevention
of introduction of
conmunicable disease.
tion and control over
introduction of soils
into the U.S.
iN
Illustration of pooled relationships, each agency respon-
sible for performance of specific responsibilities coord-
inated through planning.
Figure 2
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provisions or lacked organizational capabilities (financial, personnel,
and technological resources) to impose the prmvsions. Current statutory
powers of the regulatory agencies are not clearly applicable to protection
against unknown dangers or to protection in international territories such
as oceans; legislation would be required to provide the necessary statutory
powers. Similarly, the regulatory agencies would require additional funding
to conduct investigations of contamin gtion threats, devise protective programs,
and police activities that might violate provisions of the protective programs.
There are certain disadvantages of this pooled responsibility strategy.
First, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify
truly independent responsiblities for assignment to the various agencies.
Clearly NASA'-s responsibilities for the conduct of space exploration are
interrelated with responsibilities of the regulatory agencies; NASA is
forced to integrate otherwise independent responsibilities and cannot operate
independently from the regulatory agencies. One major issue in integration
would arise from the time orientations of the various agencies. NASA operations
require long lead time and intricate meshing of and adherence to schedules.
Constraints imposed by regulatory agencies would have to be in effect at the
start of NASA planning for any specific mission if such constraints.were to
he incorporated successfully into mission planning. The regulatory agencies,
however, are not under this type of time pressure and, given their specific
goal orientations, might be inclined to extend time deadlines-in order to
achieve greater certainty of knowledge for the formulation of constraints.
The pooled responsibility strategy also is relatively inflexible once
installed and relatively cumbersome to adapt to new or emerging issues.
Responsibilities are integrated through planning of the formal organization
structure on the basis of known information about an issue. Changing informa-
tion about an issue may require change in the assignment of responsibilites,
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change accomplished in this instance through legislation. Given the develop--
ing knowledge concerning possible back contamination from space exploration,
a more flexible approach to organization would appear desirable.
Pooled responsibility also could involve considerable duplication of
effort among the agencies, as each conducted independent investigations of
the threats of back contamination and the effectiveness of alternative
means of prevention. Independent investigations conducted by the agencies
also could result in competition for personnel and facilities.
Confronted with the prospect of constraints developed independently
by the various regulatory agencies, NASA would, in all likelihood, attempt
to form a body analogous to the ICBC as a means of coordinating these influences.
Major differences between this new body and the ICBC of the Apollo flights
concern the relative powers of the agencies involved. Given the restructuring
of responsibilities and powers outlined above, the regulatory agencies would
have more power than they held in the ICBC. Conflict over goals or means
would require resolt:tion through bargaining and political activity as before,
but actual power would be more equally distributed than was the case in.-the
ICBC. The regulatory ageocies would have more power to force NASA to
conduct desired studies, share information, and conform to prescribed constraints
than was the case in the Apollo program. As during the Apollo program, the
final result would be one of compromise among the various agencies, but
the resulting compromise would more closely reflect the concerns of the
regulatory agencies than did compromises during the Apollo program.
MATRIX ORGANIZATION
i s
	
	 Matrix organization is an approach to integration that has been applied
within NASA and within large scale industrial: organizations. The theory
j<	 of matrix organization is based on recognition Chat . segmentat-ion of indepen-- 	 i
Matrix of Responsibilities•for Space Missions
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illustrative allocation of responsibilities for the conduct of
space missions. Operating units (e.g. Space Receiving Labora-
tory) are responsible to various agencies for different activities.
Figure 3
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dent responsibilities into pooled relationships often is impossible or dys-
functional. Research, development, and production specializations can be
differentiated in terms of specialized knowledge, skills, orientations, and
disciplines, for example, while responsibilities and activities must be closely
integrated. The theory of matrix organization differentiates among types of
responsibility such as functional and programmatic responsibility and pro-
R	 poses that integration among specialized organizational units cafi be achieved
by clarifying the type of responsibility each unit holds for particular
issues. 24 Thus, for example, in Figure 3, the PHS might be assigned functional
responsibility for the establishment of criteria for prevention of back con-
tamination through returning astronauts and programmatic responsibility for
verification that these criteria are achieved in each space mission; NASA
would be assigned programmatic responsibility for the ,lesign and implementation
of programs to achieve criterion performance in space min sionv, Individual
operating units within NASA (e.g. the Space Receiving Laboratory) would be
^	 subject to direct supervision from both the PHS and NASA. Integration would 	 3r
be sought by assigning specialized units (e.g. NASA and the PHS) joint goals
(e.g. successful conduct of space missions avoiding back contamination), over-
riding their specialized objectives (e.g. developing space technology, pro-
tecting public health), identifying correlated responsibilities (e.g. func-
tional and programmatic responsibilities), and assigning both supervisory
responsibilities for operations.
rReview of NASA's history suggests that varieties of matrix organization
d	
;'.J
have been employed in the management of program offices and field center. 25 	?	 ^
Program offices are responsible for the development and supervision of
z
specific programmatic efforts (e.g. space technology) and field centers are 	 1
y
responsible for the application of these programs 	 g design 	 pP	 Pp	 P g	 (e. de i of specific
missiles). An analogous form of matrix organization might be developed for
€	 1
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relationships among NASA and other federal agencies regarding back contam-
ination programs.
As evidenced in the numerous reorganizations of relationships between
program offices and field centers of NASA, matrix organization, although
conceptually simple, is sometimes difficult to apply. Successful appli-
cation of the concept of matrix organization requires the sharing of common
°	 goals by the units involved and an integrating level of management superior
to the involved units. The Executive Office of the President might, theo-
retically, serve as this superior level of management in a matrix organization
of responsibilities of NASA, the PHS,-and other agencies. The analogy fails,
however, because the agencies are responsible to Congress rather than to the
President. Given current federal organization, Congress provides basic
direction and funding for agency efforts; certain basic responsibilities of
each agency are specified in legislative statutes. The Executive Office of
the President might seek to provide the direction necessary in matrix organi-
zation but, given Congressional powers, might often lack the authority to
resolve conflicts arising in the matrix form of organization.
Matrix organization has most application for continued interaction and
integration of specialized units over time, such as the integration of de-
fense and foreign affairs. Interactions between NASA, the PHS, and the De-
partments of Agriculture and Interior tend to focus upon the single issue of
back contamination, an issue that varies with the type of space activity
being conducted. Full scale development of a matrix organization for such
an i esue appears relatively expensive in terms of time and effort itiven the
specificity of the issue.
PROJECT ORGANIZATION
Project organization is another strategy for integrating otherwise
Z6differentiated specializations. 	 Project organization also is.an organization
-34-
strategy that has been used to considerable advantage in internal manage-
went of NASA operations. Briefly, project organization involves the for-
mation of teams of specialists formed to accomplish relatively specific
objectives, usually of a relatively short run assignment. Thus, for example,
NASA might form a project team of physicians, physical scientists, engineers,
bioscientists, and social scientists to design a space receiving laboratory
to accomplish specified objectives within set constraints. Each of the
team members would bring to the project specialized knowledge, skills, and
orientations; integration would be sought through the provision of common
goals and mission assigned the project team. Team members would be re-
sponsible to the project Leader for programmatic activities and to the
manager of the specialized unit from which they were assigned for functional
performance criteria. Specialization would be maintained through functional
responsibility, and integration would be sought through project or programmatic
responsibility.
Project organization is somewhat analogous to matrix organization in
that it attempts to maintain differentiation or specialization while pro-
viding for integration within the framework of common goals and objectives;
however, project organization differs from matrix organization in several
aspects. Project organization is focused upon relatively specific programmatic
objectives normally with a termination point; matrix organization is concerned
with relatively more general goals and relationships, which are anticipated to
be continuing over time. The integration of specialized efforts would appear
to be more easily accomplished within the framework of a project than within
the framework of matrix organization,
Tike matrix organization, project organization is possible only given
a superior level of management to fo-mulate objectives and assign respon-
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sibilities. Similarly, effective project organization requires that the
functional units from which project members are drawn have the opportunity to
appeal or contest decisions made within the project; team members must be
able to appeal to their functional bases of support, which in turn must be
able to appeal to an authority superior to the project administrator. Thus
project organization is more easily applied within a single federal agency
than among federal agencies that do not share a common superior managerial
level.
Project organization for the control of back contamination might be
conceptualized in terms of the illustration in Figure 4. Members of
agencies with specialized capabilities relating to space flight and back
contamination would be assigned to a project team responsible for the
4.	 design of back contamination protective systems; the project team, not
the related agencies, would be responsible for design of protective systems.
Responsibilities for implementation of these systems might later be assigned
to whatever established agencies are most appropriate.
The project organization depicted in Figure 4 resembles in certain
respects the ICBS established for the Apollo flights. Comparison of the
ICBC with an ideal project organization, however, points up certain prerequi-
sites of project organization and difficulties of applying project organi-
zation among federal agencies. The ICBC was composed of representatives
of different specialized agencies (NASA, PHS, Agriculture, Interior), not
project or team members assigned temporarily to the project; representatives
met occasionally as team members but carried fulltime responsibilities in
their permanent assignments. The ICBC had no clearly assigned programmatic
objectives for which it was responsible; rather the committee operated
under an umbrella type of goal, which could encompass the different goals
of the participating agencies. The ICBC was not responsible to any superior
if
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authority for accomplishing objectives, whereas the member agencies were
individually responsible to superior authorities for accomplishing
specialized objectives. Decisions reached in the ICBC Caere not clearly
binding upon member agencies, and, given joint responsibilities of agencies
to the President and the Congress, member agencies had alternative routes
0
for appeal of any ICBC decision.
In theory, project organization appears uniquely suited to the
development and appli.ca tLion of systems for protection against back con-
tamination. A relatively specific objective could be formulated and
project teams could be established to integrate the various specialized
skills and disciplines necessary to accomplish that objective. In practice,
however, effective project management involving otherwise independent
agencies within the federal government appears difficult to achieve given
dual responsibilities to the President and the Congress and the relative
inflexibility of authorities and responsibilities established in statutes.
CENTRALIZATION
Another strategy for the design of organizational responsibilities
for prevention of back contamination might involve the centralization of
responsibilities within a single body, presumably NASA. Just as respon-
sibility for conducting space activities has been assigned to NASA, so
tight responsibility for implementation of the back contamination pro-
visions of the Space Treaty and protection of the U.S. against the intro-
duction of contaminants from outer space. Responsibilities that currently 	 ..i
are differentiated among NASA and the three regulatory agencies might be	 j
_.f
centralized within a single agency. This strategy has been proposed by
Robinson as a means of clarifying legal responsibilities and statutory
y I	 ^	 I	 ^	 S.
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authority for the imposition of controls necessary to prevent back con-
tamination.27
Centralization of responsibility in a single agency would overcome
the difficulties of coordinating responsibilities now diffused among
federal agencies. Coordination through line authority presumably would
a
be easier within a single agency than currently is the case. Although all
b	 the agencies report through the Executive Office of the President, no clear
line authority for integration of activities now exists. The agencies
i
have statutory responsibilities established through Congressional action,
and the President is not empowered to alter these responsibilities. Inte-
gration of activities imposed through line authority and administration is a
viable alternative within a single agency, but it is not viable as a strategy
of the Executive Office in the integration of responsibilities of various
agencies. Integration of responsibilities would require legislative action
assigning overall responsibilities to NASA and clarifying the related re-
sponsibilities of federal regulatory agencies.
Centralization of back contamination responsibilities within NASA
could overcome problems of coordination and integration, conceivably at
the expense of the advantages provided through specialization and differ-
.;:
i
entiation of responsibilities. The regulatory agencies (PHS, Agriculture,
Interior) have personnel familiar with problems of health, infestation,
and contamination, resources not now available within NASA. The regulatory 	 k,
4	 `?
agencies also have many years of experience, which NASA lacks, in the design,
implementation, and administration of programs such as quarantine. Finally,
the goals of protection of hP.alth and natural resources have been inter-
nalized by the staff of the regulatory agencies and constitute a tradition
i
equivalent to a disciplinary orientation; these goals appear to be peripheral
^i
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in the NASA tradition, and even if imposed by statute, would 'become inter-
nalized only through time and considerable effort. The advantages of ex-
pertise, history, tradition, and goal orientation now present within the
regulatory agencies would be lost through centralization of responsibilities
	
^.I
with NASA.
Centralization of back contamination responsibilities within NASA
At	 shifts the issues of balancing differentiation and integration from the
level of the Executive Office of the President and federal.agencies to
a subordinate level of the NASA administrator and NASA programs and oper-
ations. The provision of effective protection against back contamination
requires that the NASA ortanization be developed to provide that protection.
The organization sketched in Figure 5 suggests one way this might be
accomplished.
A life science program office would be established within NASA
with responsibilities for life sciences research and for pro-
tecting against extraterrestrial contamination, both outbound
and inbound. As recommended in the 1964 NASA report, this pro-
gram would carry status equivalent to that of other program
offices within NASA. Creation of such a program office would
appear necessary to signal acceptance of life science goals as
equivalent to technology development goals within NASA and to
develop the expertise necessary in the design and implementation
of life science and back contamination programs. The life sciences
program within NASA would function as other programs in the de-
sign of programs of research, development of technology, and	 +
implementation through the field centers.
j
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An advisory council analogous to the ICBS would be established
to relate to the life sciences program. Representatives to
this council would be assigned from the PHS, the Departments of
Agriculture and Interior, and the National Academy of Sciences.
During early years of the development of the NASA life sciences
program, the council would provide a means of coordinating
existing expertise; the council might later be abandoned as
such expertise was developed within NASA. Given the changes in
legislation proposed earlier, the council would necessarily be
advisory to NASA without any formal authority over back con-
tamination issues.
As the current practice is within NASA, programs for conducting
life sciences and back contamination research, technology de-
velopment, and administration of back contamination protection
might be-contracted through the field centers to federal agencies
such as ?HS and Agriculture. The existing expertise of the
specialized resources now in these agencies might be tapped in
this manner, leaving responsibility for the direction of back
contamination programs within NASA.
The organizational strategy proposed here offers a number of advantages
in clarification of existing confusion regarding back contamination re-
sponsibilities and in integration of responsibilities, while exploiting
current specialized expertise. Implementation of this strategy would
require legislative action, funding, and continued effort to develop
the life sciences orientation within NASA. Given the lead time required
in mission planning, it is questionable whether this strategy could be
fully implemented in time to be operations- for future Viking missions.
i
i
i
It does appear to be a viable alternative for the provision of
back contamination protections for later missions, which undoubetdly
will follow the Viking series.
i
Q
GOORDINATING BODY
An alternative organizational strategy for coordinating responsi-
bilities for protecting against back contamination would involve a
special coordinating body like the ICBC of the Apollo programs. 	 Two
types of coordinating bodies, council and committee, are considered.
Both types have been employed in the coordination of federal departments
and agencies, and this analysis draws upon experiences with both approaches.
One approach is the establishment of a council, such as the National i.
Security Council. 	 The National Security Council, established in 1947 in
a reorganization of the federal government, focuses on integration of
domestic, foreign,-and military policies relating to national security.
Departments and agencies such as State, Defense, Central Intelligence,
and Civilian Defense Mobilization are all assigned specific statutory
responsibilities that affect national security, differentiated responsi-
bilities that require integration for maximum effectiveness. 	 All these
departments and agencies report to both the President and Congress for
direction, funding, and supervision, and conflicts among the departments
can be resolved formally only through appeal to both or either the
President and/or Congress. 	 The NSC was established as a unit within
the Executive Office of the President, with statutory responsibilities
-^
to advise the President and with funding through the Congress. 	 Analyses
of the operations of the NSC indicate that the role of the council varies
somewhat with the administrative style of the President but that, in
_	 f
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general, the council serves as a forum for airing issues before the
'resident as input for decisions by the President. One analysis of
the NSC suggests that member departments and agencies should attempt
to keep particularly c7:itical issues out of the NSC forum and should,
whenever possible, negotiate resolution of these issues informally. 28
Whether the NSC provides the forum for discussion and coordination of
efforts or the existence of the forum provides the impetus for informal
negotiation and resolution of conflict, the net result would appear to
be positive. The NSC, established in the Executive Office of the President,
provides a formal vehicle for the resolution of interdepartmental conflict
and coordination of efforts related to national security programs.
The approach of interagency committees is Less formal than the
coordinating council and is illustrated by the ICBC of the Apollo program.
The interagency committee can be established through joint negotiation of
the involved agencies with approval and/or direction from the Office of
the President; statutory assignment of responsibilities and Congressional
funding apparently are not required. Such a committee need not be limited
to advising and might include decision making, although member agencies
still bear any individual responsibilities assigned by statute. luter-
agency committees are considerably more flexible than are councils and
would appear to be more appropriate for relatively specialized and short-
term issues such as back contamination prevention. One shortcoming of the
:interagency committee approach, which has been noted in our analysis of the
ICBC, concerns goal commitments. A council such as the NSC is assigned
statutory responsibilities and hence goals, but goals of an interagency
committee emerge from agency negotiations and, reflecting independent
agency goals, are less likely to be shared goals. For maximum effectiveness
of the interagency committee, influence of the Executive Office of the
r
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President ought to be exerted in the specification of goals for the committee.
Another potential shortcoming of the interagency committee approach relates
to funds-rig of committee efforts and the relative power of committee members
in the control of these funding resources. 	 Committee efforts, if dependent 't
upon resources provided by member agencies, will likely be dominated by the
agency providing most of the resources and be less responsive to concerns of
F=; other agencies.	 The interagency committee sight also be improved as a means
f' of resolving interagency conflict if provided with a forum for appeal to the
k4*.
yY
Executive Office of the President such as exists with the NSC.	 The National
Aeronautics and Space Council (NASC), now defunct, might have provided such a
channel for an interagency committee for back contamination.	 Recreation of i
{the NASC or identification of some alternative council with an interagency
committee on back contamination would provide a means for appeal to the President a
by individual agencies involved in the committee and an impetus for conflict
resolution within the committee. i
Application of the coordinating body strategy in development of protections
against back contamination from space might be accomplished through the following:
Re-establishment of a National Aeronautics and Space Council
^ii,
within the Executive Office of the President with specifically
F
assigned responsibilities to advise the President on obligations
= of the Space Treaty and funding of the Council operations.
Statutory change to assign responsibilities and delegate outhori.ties
. for protection against back coutamivati.on as suggested in the pooled
Y'
. relationships approach.
Establishment of an interagency c.mmittee on back contamination n
within the NASC with membership from NASA, PHs, Agriculture,
Interior, and the National Academy of Sciences and provision for
funding of the committee through the NASC.
,=f
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Illustrative Organization with Coordinating Body.
Figure 6
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SUMMARY AND RRCOMMATIONS
4
Concern over the development and implementation of programs to prevent
back contamination from space missions calls forth issues of administration
of federal programs and agencies. Various investigations have focused upon
the administration of federal programs and various attempts at reorganization
of federal administration have been proposed. Direction, supervision, and
review of federal programs and agencies are shared by the executive and
legislative branches; statutory responsibilities are imposed and funding
provided by both bodies acting in concert, day--to-day administration. is pro--
vided by the executive branch, and periodic review is provided by the legi.s-
lative branch. Statutory responsibilities and authorities established 	 `.
through legislative action constitute a formal and relatively stable pattern
organizational relationships. Programs that emerge over time often call
; s
r responsibilities, authorities, and relationships not foreseen in the
_i
earlier alignment of organizational structure; examples include the integra-
tion of programs for national security and space exploration. The prevention
of back contamination from space exploration is another such example, although
on a much smaller scale.
Responsibility for the prevention of back contamination from space ex-
ploration, while accepted by the U.S. in the Space Treaty, has not been de-
legated specifically to any federal agency; neither have necessary powers to
perform been created. Development of effective programs to prevent back
r
contamination requires as a first step the clarification of responsibilities
for and authorities necessary to accomplish specified goals.
Various organizational strategies for prevention of back contamination
have been identified and reviewed in this report. These strategies differ
in the manner in which responsibilities are differentiated among federal
agencies and the means of coordinating or integrating these responsibilities.
i
,...: , 	 1	 u	 -	 `Jt	 i t
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In summary, either of two proposed strategies appear most feasible: (1) central-- 	 s
ization of responsibilities within NASA, or (2) differentiation of responsibi-
lities among federal agencies and integration through an interagency committee
and the NAS Council.
Centralization of responsibilities within NASA would clearly impose upon 	 -
NASA the goal of preventing back contamination, an element now lacking. The
coordination of planning space missions, exploring in space, developing space
technology, and preventing back contamination would be facilitated through
centralization. The advantages of specialization now present in NASA, PHS,
Agriculture, and Interior would suffer; however, NASA would of necessity
_i
either develop competing specializations at considerable cost or develop means
of sub-contracting and utilizing existing specializations.
The approach of pooled responsibilities coordinated through an inter-
agency committee and a NAS Council would utilize existing specializations
of disciplines and abilities. The integration of disciplines would be pro-
vided through the interagency committee and likely would be more cumbersome
than integration through centralization wi nin NASA.
Choice between these two strategies must be judgmental. On balance, we 	 j
favor the approach of centralization of responsibilities within NASA. NASA
has demonstrated considerable ability in innovations in managerial organization.,
planning, and control in the past, and we judge it likely that similar abilities
would be demonstrated in this instance. It is more likely that NASA will be
able to develop effective means of coping with responsibilities for prevention
of back contamination than it is that equally effective means will emerge from
i'
interagency efforts. Both legislative and executive action required to
effectuate this strate gy also appear less complex than that which would be
ri
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